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The design and development process for the Internet of Things (IoT) applications is more complicated than that
for desktop, mobile, or web applications. First, IoT applications require both software and hardware to work
together across many different types of nodes with different capabilities under different conditions. Secondly,
IoT application development involves different types of software engineers such as desktop, web, embedded
and mobile to work together. Further, non-software engineering personal such as business analysts are also
involved in the design process. In the addition to the complexity of having multiple software engineering
specialists cooperating to merge different hardware and software component together, the development process
required different software and hardware stacks to integrated together (e.g., different stacks from different
companies such as Microsoft Azure, IBM Bluemix). Due to above complexities, more often non-functional
requirements (such as security and privacy which are highly important in the context of IoT) tend to get
ignored or treated as second class citizens in IoT application development process. In this paper, we have
reviewed techniques, methods and tools that are being developed to support incorporating security and privacy
requirements into traditional application designs. By doing so, we aim to explore how those techniques could
be applicable to the IoT domain. During our review, we realised that by far the majority of the requirement
engineering efforts are focused on security. In this paper, we primarily focused on two different aspects: (1)
design notations, models, and languages that facilitate capturing non-functional requirements (i.e., security
and privacy), and (2) proactive and reactive interaction techniques that can be used to support and augment
the IoT application design process. Our goal is not only to analyse, compare and consolidate past research
work but also to appreciate their findings and discuss their applicability towards the IoT.
CCS Concepts: • Human-centered computing → Ubiquitous and mobile computing systems and
tools; Visualization systems and tools; • Software and its engineering → Software design engineering; •
Security and privacy→ Security requirements;
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Functional Requirements, Notation, Design Principles
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1 INTRODUCTION
Until 2003, Cisco IBSG’s [22] did not recognise IoT due to the few numbers of connected devices
where there was only 0.08 device per person. With the exponential growth of smartphones, tablets,
smart devices and their applications over the years, connected things significantly increase for
each person. In 2010, there were 6.8 billion people using 12.5 billion devices which are 1.84 devices
per person. Due to technological enhancements in distributed affordable sensors, contactless data
exchange such as RFID, short-range wireless such as Bluetooth and ZigBee, and internet mobile
access, a global network of connected things has increased [7]. It is predicted to reach 20-24 billion
connected devices by 2020 [89] [34].
Designing and developing IoT applications is complicated compared to the one created for
desktop, web, or mobile applications. First, IoT applications need to support different technologies
working together such as hardware/firmware, software, sensor, semantic, cloud, data storing, data
modelling, processing, and communication technologies [70]. All of these components are working
throughout many different types of nodes under different conditions and challenges, and all of
them could be vulnerable to attacks [34]. Moreover, applications should consider many features
that IoT needs to support such as devices heterogeneity, scalability, ubiquitous data exchange,
semantic interoperability and data management, etc. [61] [13]. In order to the Internet of Things
to be successful, the development process needs to consider the whole connecting devices, and
improving the scenarios used in traditional mobile computing [34].
In addition to IoT heterogeneity nature, IoT applications involve the cooperation of multiple
software engineers whose having different expertise. Those engineers are working together on
different components with different application domains such as home automation, smart cities,
smart driving...etc. Due to the lacking of full-stack developers, the development process needs to
have a common programming framework to support developers needs [29]. Moreover, end-users
preferences are divers and they need to create these preferences using graphical user interface
(GUI) at run-time. Consequently, applications developers and devices manufacturers should focus
on the end-user requirements [38].
As a result of the stated complexities, non-functional requirements (NFRs), such as security
and privacy, have not received sufficient attention [86] especially in the traditional Software
Development Lifecycle (SDLC). It has been stated that the main source of software vulnerabilities
is discovered to be in the early stages of the SDLC and the majority of them could be eliminated
at this step [27]. Consequently, adopting security and privacy in SDLC is becoming critical, and
embedding them in the early stage of the SDLC become an insistent [85] [27]. Microsoft took a
step forward and introduced Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) that consists of
practices for supporting security [59].
With the raising connectivity towards the IoT and having massive of new devices and applications
that are connected to the internet every year, threats keep changing [43]. The burden of the
vulnerabilities in the traditional SDLC become bigger with the IoT heterogeneity. Security by
Design (SbD) has been approved that it is an effective way to create a secure system by emerging
security at an early stage of the software development lifecycle (SDLC). As well as SbD, Privacy by
Design (PbD) is recently recognized to be an important and useful approach for preserving privacy
for software-based systems [78]. This importance is confirmed by REGULATION (EU) 2016/679
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [21] which is applied to all systems that deal with
personal data processing which is common in IoT applications. The contribution of this paper is as
follows:
• Review the evolution of design notations, models, and languages that facilitates capturing
non-functional requirements (i.e., security and privacy).
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• Propose and use a taxonomy to compare and contrast past approaches.
• Review a few selected tools that have been built to facilitate capturing non-functional require-
ments from two different perspectives: (i) proactive and (ii) reactive interaction techniques.
Paper structure. The paper is structured into sections as follows: section 2 presents background
information about the traditional software development life cycle and its phases. Section 3 gives a
brief IoT overview and how IoT differ from embedded systems. This section includes a case scenario
that will be used in a later section. Section 4 explains the difference between the distributed nature
of IoT application development and traditional SDLC. In section 5, we briefly introduce functional
and non-functional requirements. Literature search and selection methodology are introduced in
section 6, with some details about search queries and steps of data selection and extraction. Section
7 and 8 gives an exploratory analysis of some of the available design notations and design principle
respectively. Section 9 discusses the survey limitations. Section 10 concludes the survey.
2 TRADITIONAL SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE
Let us now briefly introduce software development life cycle (SDLC) in general as it helps to
understand the remaining sections of the paper. In later sections, we will discuss specific challenges
in IoT and their impact on SDLC.
In software engineering, SDLC is the most significant element. SDLC is a traditional methodology
(or process) used for building and maintaining software systems where some essential phases
should be followed. In general, software developments models have three primary goals which are
improving the system quality, providing management controls and maximizing productivity. There
are several different software development life cycle models. Each one is developed for specific
purposes. According to Hoffer [40] and Valacich [87], SDLC consists of five phases which are
planning, analysis, design, implementation and maintenance as shown in Figure 1.
The planning phase is used for identifying and analysing information system needs. Then,
these needs are prioritized and translated into a development schedule. After that, the proposed
problem is investigated to determine the proposed system scope. In analysis phase, requirements
are determined, and some alternative designs are suggested and compared. After the requirements
are analysed, they become well-defined and documented. The outcome of analysis phase is software
requirement specification (SRS) document. SRS document lists all the essential requirements that
needed to be designed and developed. At the end of this stage, SRS document is handled to the
end-user to approve it [54].
In the design phase, all the provided description will be converted into logical and then physical
system specifications. The logical design is independent of any software, hardware or platform.
Planning
Analysis
DesignImplementation
Maintenance
Fig. 1. Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) based on [40] and [87]
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It focusses on business features of the system. While in physical design, the specifications are
transformed into technical specifications. In the implementation phase, six major activities are
done which are coding, testing, installation, documentation, training and support. The goal of this
phase is to translate the physical system specifications into reliable working software. It also record
all the work that has been done. This phase also is considering the support for all users current
and future once [40]. The last phase is maintenance phase, where fixing any issues founded by the
customer/end-user is performed to keep the system working well. Although the previous described
SDLC gives a general overview of the systems development process, there are very specific methods
that use the idea of the SDLC with some additions. For example, Microsoft’s Security Development
Lifecycle (SDL) is a specialized SDLC that consists of practices for supporting security [59].
As mentioned earlier, system development has many models such as waterfall model, spiral, v
model, prototype, agile model etc. Each model has its own features, drawback and usage. Initially
traditional development was introduced with some extends such as in waterfall, v model, incremen-
tal and spiral models. In any model of them, each phase of SDLC has deliverables and outcomes
that used for the next phase in the life cycle. They differ about the way that life cycle is arranged
and executed as seen in Table 1. There are some weaknesses related to these types of models, such
as high effort, time and cost to change after a milestone is delivered.
As known, all the models, regardless of their names or types, have somewhat of requirement
management and design phase. Either way it is only done at the beginning of the model or repeated
as an iteration through the system development. There are many consequences when managing
requirements and design are only done once at early stage of the system development. The major
effect is the high-cost of restarting or remodelling the system once major mistakes happened. The
other impact that gradually affect the cost happens when end-user requirements are keep changing
while developing the system where changes in this stage are expensive. As stated by Geer [27],
the main source of software vulnerabilities is exposed in the early stage of the SDLC and the most
of them could be excluded at this step. Consequently, it is important factor for cost reduction to
highlight any vulnerabilities/mistakes at design stage which is much cheaper than fixing them in
later stages.
As a result, other types of modelling such as agile modelling, as illustrated in Table 1, and
object-oriented analysis and design (OOAD) are introduced to overcome the traditional SDLC
limitations where remodelling/restarting is not expensive. A short comparison between traditional
development, agile development and object-oriented analysis and design are given in Table 2. This
comparison is based on some criterias such as primary objectives, requirement, cost of restarting
and remodeling, etc. This table can give to some extent an overview about gathering and fulfilling
user requirements and the cost of change in each model. It could help system engineers to clearly
decide which model to follow before developing any system.
3 OVERVIEW OF INTERNET OF THINGS
Let us now briefly introduce IoT applications and their characteristics in general. In subsequent
sections, we discuss SDLC from IoT perspective highlighting unique aspects and challenges of
IoT. According to Gartner, the Internet of Things is the network of physical objects that contain
embedded technology to communicate and sense or interact with their internal states or the external
environment [89]. These physical objects or things can be buildings, devices, automobiles, and other
objects that embedded with sensors, software, electronics and network connection. DNA analysis
devices, implanted heart monitoring and biochip transponders on animals are some examples of
things that support the IoT concept. These devices gather suitable data using a variety of existing
technologies and then move these data between other devices.
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List of graphical illustration for some Software Development Models
Waterfall model. Based on [87]. V model. Based on [8].
Incremental model. Based on [54]. Spiral model. Based on [87].
Scrum (Agile model). Based on [76]. Rational Unified Process (RUP). Based on [87].
Table 1. List of graphical illustration for some Software Development Models: Waterfall model, V model,
Incremental model, Spiral model, Scrum (Agile model) and Rational Unified Process (RUP) model. All of them
vary on the way the life cycle is arranged and applied.
IoT history. Since the internet is founded in 1989, the idea of connecting things on the internet
has been started. However, the term of Internet of Things (IoT) did not become popular till 1999
when it is created by Kevin Ashton, executive director of the Auto-ID Centre, MIT. At the same
year, a global Radio-frequency identification (RFID) was invented which considered as a starting
point for IoT. In 2000, LG company revealed its plan to produce a smart refrigerator that would
determine by itself whether the food items are filled or not. The major trigger of IoT was in 2011
when IPv6 was lunched. Since then many famous IT companies such as Cisco, Ericson and IBM
started to initiate many of IoT educational and commercial applications [81].
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Software Development Models List
Traditional development Agile development object-oriented analysis
and design (OOAD)
Development model Life cycle model. Evolutionary-delivery
model.
Object-Oriented approach.
Primary objectives Safety. Too many process
and documentation is done
for safety wich lead to slow
development.
Quick results due to doing
many iterations.
Quality and productivity
by focussing in inheritance
for refutability.
Organizational structure Formal, targeting large or-
ganizations.
Flexible, targeting
small\medium organi-
zations.
Flexible, focussing on ob-
jects.
User requirements Well-defined before imple-
mentation.
Co-operative input. Co-operative.
Changes adaption Poor changes adaption.
Models such as waterfall
does not allow changes of
defined requirements as
the project is progressing.
Changes and corrections
are one each iteration.
Changes and corrections
are one each iteration.
End-product fulfilling the
requirements
Since changes are limited
through the development,
it is potential that the soft-
ware could not fully meet
the end-user requirement.
Since user is co-operating
and changes are repeatedly
applied, it is potential that
the software would meet
the end-user requirement.
Since user is co-operating
and changes are repeatedly
applied, it is potential that
the software would meet
the end-user requirement.
Cost of restarting High. Low. cost is reduced. For each
iteration, full assessment is
done for needed correction
[39].
Cost of remodeling Expensive. Not expensive due to user
engagment and repeated
assessment.
Not expensive due to con-
tinuous assessment.
Testing Done after coding. Done each iteration. Done in iterations.
Developers Organized with a plan. Co-located and interactive. Interactive.
Size of teams and projects Large. Small. Large-scale projects.
There are some extends
to OOAD approaches,
such as Rational Unified
Process (RUP) [62], to sup-
port small\micro software
teams\projects.
Table 2. Differences between traditional, agile and object-oriented analysis and design (OOAD) development
approach. OOAD shares the iterative method from agile model, consequently they share some characteristics
[54][87][39]
.
3.1 Difference Between IoT and Embedded Systems
Embedded systems, called sometimes embedded chipsets, are computing devices that are sitting
on the edge of an IoT product. Connecting sensors to the internet is the main responsibility of
the embedded system. It is also managing the communication between sensors and network by
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MobileInsertable	cardiac	monitors	(IC s)	sensor	
is	implanted	into	patient	body
Fig. 2. Insertable cardiac monitors (ICMs)
Smart
airconditioner
(Thing)
Cloud
Smart
phone
(Thing)
AC is switched
on\off based on phone
GPS and temperature
Network technology
Nest
Thermostat 
(Thing)
Embedded technology
IoT technology
Information
Home	temperature	,
humidity,	light
and	activity	sensors
Instructions
and	location
Instructions	
Fig. 3. IoT Vs. Embedded systems
gathering, packaging and sending the data to an application. Furthermore, it may execute local
application and security. Embedded system usually consists of a microcontroller that programmed
to do a specific job. Once an embedded device is given access to the internet, it becomes an IoT
device. For example, a lower power-consuming device such as implanted heart monitoring, showed
in Figure 2, considered as an embedded device. It becomes an IoT device if it can transmit signal
and pulses reading to a server’s log via the Internet. These readings are checked then to see if there
is an abnormality level. If there is, the server sends an alert to the concerned patient,s family mobile
and doctors with some details such as the condition of the patient.
Another example that can illustrate the idea of embedded system and IoT is smart air conditioner
(AC) and Nest learning thermostat as seen in Figure 3. Nest thermostat is a programmable smart
thermostat with self-learning Wi-Fi developed by Nest Labs. It can conserve energy by adjusting
the heating and cooling of homes and businesses. Nest has an embedded system that sends home
temperature, humidity, light and activity sensors. The smart AC by itself has an embedded system
that can switch the AC on\off based on the temperature sensor. It becomes an IoT system once AC
is connected to the internet, the cloud on this example, and interacted with the Nest temperature
device and app. By taking advantage of Nest and AC sensors and phones’ locations, the energy can
be turned to saving mode when nobody is at home.
3.2 Example IoT scenario
In this section, diabetes treatment and monitoring use case scenario is presented from a problem
owner’s perspective. Developing an IoT application can solve this problem. This scenario highlights
some privacy challenges as we will explain later.
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CGM sensor
Mobile
Doctors
 Nurses
Researchers
Cloud Platform
Local Server at
the healthcare
company 
sensor is attached to patient body
Smart watch
Fig. 4. IoT application to support diabetes treatment monitoring
Use case: diabetes treatment and monitoring. Sara is a researcher in a healthcare company where
patients with diabetes require treatment and continual monitoring. Sara is concerned about gather-
ing and analysing data from a Continuous Glucose Monitor (CGM) device worn by patients where
the sensor placed into the patient,s body, not into his bloodstream as seen in Figure 4. The sensor
measures the glucose in the patient interstitial fluid by taking readings at regular intervals for
several days. Sara has a monitoring application that can recognize any triggers or patterns for
glucose abnormal levels. This application can analyse patient data and produce an alarm to notify
the patient and the nurse. There is a speciality nurse that has a level of access to patient data for
following-up and provide essential instructions when required. These instructions may include
suitable insulin dosage, an exercise plan, daily meals\snacks, and types\dosage of medications.
4 IOT SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE
IoT has its own properties, requirements and challenges. Heterogeneous is one of the main chal-
lenges where managing and securing different objects, devices, sensors, protocols and applications
are complicated [33]. Moreover, each object could be developed in a diverse way, by diverse manu-
facturers. As a result, adding some changes or enhancements to the traditional SDLC are required.
Privacy as one of the NFRs could be the greatest trouble in a ubiquitous computing [42]. Pew
Internet research [11] stated that 54 % of app users refuse to install a mobile app when they realized
the amount of personal information the app gathered. Also, 30 % of the smartphone owners do
not want to share personal information which causes uninstalling the app after knowing that it
collects personal data.
We will apply some of the privacy as one of NFRs to the previous use case mentioned in section
3.2 Figure 4 to see how these requirements are important in IoT. When the sensor of Continuous
Glucose Monitor (CGM) patient’s device sends the glucose readings to the application, the data
travelling is not straight forward. These data will go through different nodes until it reaches its final
destination as seen in Figure 5. One of these nodes could be a third party who could have access
to patient sensitive data such as location without having the patient permission or without the
research company knowledge. This can happen as a result of the app developers lack of knowing
what third parties libraries are collecting from the users [9] [3]. Data subjects actually lose control
over their data when they are stored on a server operated by a third party. According to [42], half
of the analyzed app by the study team via PrivacyGrade.org are using location, not because the
app wants it but because the third party library uses it.
, Vol. 9, No. 9, Article 99. Publication date: September 9999.
Designing Security and Privacy Requirements in Internet of Things: A Survey 99:9
Connection
Devices\Things
Network
Middleware
Application
Data &
semantic
Se
cu
rit
y
Pr
iv
ac
yC
ro
ss
-la
ye
rs
Fig. 5. Heterogeneous IoT Framework. Data and semantic travelling is not straight forward. Starting from
the source, it goes through different nodes until it reaches its final destination.
In the case of the health field, such as the described use case, distributing patients, data such
as location, phone number, patient file number and medical history is critical. In this use case
anonymization as one of the privacy characteristics is violated. These problems can be solved by
applying some of the privacy patterns during software development such as using protection against
tracking, onion routing, and anonymity set privacy patterns.
Since smartphones are the most developed app in ubiquitous computing, one of the offered
solutions is dividing the smartphone ecosystem for privacy into many entities [42]. These enti-
ties share the responsibility for privacy which are: Developers, Third-party developers, Service
providers, App stores, OS providers, Hardware manufacturers, Government agencies and third
parties interested in privacy, and Users. Therefore, it very clear IoT applications have a significant
potential (much more than mobile applications) to collect personal information that could lead to
significant privacy violation. Therefore, it is extremely important to integrate the non-functional
requirement into IoT application designs.
5 FUNCTIONAL AND NON FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Let us now briefly introduce non-functional requirements in general, before we focus on privacy
and security in subsequent sections. Some studies have shown that the effectiveness of requirements
engineering (RE), in software projects, is an important success factor [63]. There are many types of
requirements and the three common types are: business requirements, the software value in business
terms; functional requirements (FRs), known as qualitative requirements; and non-functional
requirements (NFRs), known as quantitative requirements [74] [56]. Business requirements which
define how the system improve the needs of the organization. FRs define the system services,
functions or behaviour, that the system supposed to accomplish. On the other hand, NFRs can
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be defined as the quality attributes (e.g., security, integrity, reliability, usability) or the applied
constraints on the application during the development process [32] [83]. Most of the efforts that
have been done previously are focused on functional requirements (FRs). However, many efforts are
focusing currently on non-functional requirements (NFRs) since many studies show that engaging
NFRs in early design phases has improved significantly the end-user satisfaction [6] [32].
Functional requirements (FRs) defines the way to understand what is required to build a system
correctly and deliver what the end-user expects. In API development, FRs define the expected
functionality for the API which requires the end-user collaboration. Functional requirements gath-
ering is located at in the analysis phase [74]. Holding interviews, meetings, or using questionnaires
to ask end-users are some of the ways to capture FRs. These requirements are typically given a
unique identifier for each one and a description in a requirements document. An example of these
requirements is: REQ1.1. The system shall authenticate that the entered PIN number by the user is
correct.
Table 3. high-Level Non-Functional Requirements (NFRs) Classification
Characteristics Description Sub-Characteristics
Intrinsic Qualities characteristics of the product/solution itself Functional suitability
Performance efficiency
Compatibility
Usability
Reliability
Security
Maintainability
Portability
Usage Qualities characteristics related to outcomes of user Effectiveness
interaction with the product/solution Efficiency
Satisfaction
Safety
Usability scope
External Qualities market-related characteristics associated Service Cost
with the product/solution Vendor Risk Mitigation
Product Risk Mitigation
Non-functional requirements are used to support the functional one. While FRs describe how
the system should behave, the NFRs describe the functioning constraints that guarantee end-
user satisfaction. Examples of non-functional requirements include many characteristics such as:
performance, flexibility, platform compatibility, security, scalability, usability and recovery [74].
ISO/IEC (the International Organization for Standardization) and (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) proposes solution attributes, called ’Qualities‘, that can be divided into 3 categories
in ISO/IEC 25010:2011 [45]. These Qualities serve as top-level non-functional requirements (NFRs),
which are breakdown to detailed level NFRs as seen in Table 3 and 4. Privacy framework introduced
in another standard called ISO/IEC 29100:2011(en) [1]. There are many standards from ISO/IEC
that are divided based on the policy maker viewpoint such as 29151: Code of practice for personally
identifiable information protection and 20889:Privacy enhancing data de-identification techniques.
There are many standardization organization and not limited to ISO for defining NFRs, but the
listed one here just to have an idea about some them and their meaning from ISO.
Characteristics Sub-Characteristics Description
Functional complete-
ness
degree to which the set of functions covers all the specified tasks and
user objectives
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Functional correctness degree to which a product or system provides the correct results with
the needed degree of precision.Functional suitability
Functional appropriate-
ness
degree to which the functions facilitate the accomplishment of speci-
fied tasks and objectives.
Time behaviour degree to which the response and processing times and throughput
rates of a product or system, when performing its functions, meet
requirements.
Resource utilization degree to which the amounts and types of resources used by a product
or system, when performing its functions, meet requirementsPerformance efficiency
Capacity degree to which themaximum limits of a product or system parameter
meet requirements.
Co-existence degree to which a product can perform its required functions effi-
ciently while sharing a common environment and resources with
other products, without detrimental impact on any other product.Compatibility Interoperability degree to which two or more systems, products or components can ex-
change information and use the information that has been exchanged.
Appropriateness recog-
nizability
degree to which users can recognize whether a product or system is
appropriate for their needs.
Learnability degree to which a product or system can be used by specified users
to achieve specified goals of learning to use the product or system
with effectiveness, efficiency, freedom from risk and satisfaction in a
specified context of use.
Operability degree to which a product or system has attributes that make it easy
to operate and control.
User error protection degree to which a system protects users against making errors.
User interface aesthetics degree to which a user interface enables pleasing and satisfying
interaction for the user.
Usability
Accessibility degree to which a product or system can be used by people with the
widest range of characteristics and capabilities to achieve a specified
goal in a specified context of use.
Maturity degree to which a system, product or component meets needs for
reliability under normal operation.
Availability degree to which a system, product or component is operational and
accessible when required for use.
Fault tolerance degree to which a system, product or component operates as intended
despite the presence of hardware or software faults.Reliability
Recoverability degree to which, in the event of an interruption or a failure, a product
or system can recover the data directly affected and re-establish the
desired state of the system.
Confidentiality degree to which a product or system ensures that data are accessible
only to those authorized to have access.
Integrity degree to which a system, product or component prevents unautho-
rized access to, or modification of, computer programs or data.
Non-repudiation degree to which actions or events can be proven to have taken place,
so that the events or actions cannot be repudiated later.
Accountability degree to which the actions of an entity can be traced uniquely to
the entity.
Security
Authenticity degree to which the identity of a subject or resource can be proved
to be the one claimed.
Modularity degree to which a system or computer program is composed of dis-
crete components such that a change to one component has minimal
impact on other components.
Reusability degree to which an asset can be used in more than one system, or in
building other assets.
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Analysability degree of effectiveness and efficiency with which it is possible to
assess the impact on a product or system of an intended change to
one or more of its parts, or to diagnose a product for deficiencies or
causes of failures, or to identify parts to be modified.
Modifiability degree to which a product or system can be effectively and efficiently
modified without introducing defects or degrading existing product
quality.
Maintainability
Testability degree of effectiveness and efficiency with which test criteria can
be established for a system, product or component and tests can be
performed to determine whether those criteria have been met.
Adaptability degree to which a product or system can effectively and efficiently
be adapted for different or evolving hardware, software or other
operational or usage environments.
Installability degree of effectiveness and efficiency with which a product or sys-
tem can be successfully installed and/or uninstalled in a specified
environment.Portability
Replaceability degree to which a product can replace another specified software
product for the same purpose in the same environment.
anonymization process by which personally identifiable information (PII) is irre-
versibly altered in such a way that a PII principal can no longer be
identified directly or indirectly, either by the PII controller alone or
in collaboration with any other party
pseudonymization process applied to personally identifiable information (PII) which
replaces identifying information with an aliasPrivacy *
consent personally identifiable information (PII) principal,s freely given, spe-
cific and informed agreement to the processing of their PII
Table 4. Detailed-Level of Non-Functional Requirements (NFRs) Classification from ISO/IEC 25010 [45].
(*)Privacy characteristics are example and are not limited to the listed one here from ISO/IEC 29100 [1].
6 METHODOLOGY
In order to build this survey, we followed a search strategy. The first step was selecting papers
in google scholar to avoid publisher basis. Then we search on specific libraries based on forward
and backword snowballing. After that, it was data extraction step to extract some of the properties
from each notation/representation. Finally, we analysed the data to find the review results.
6.1 Data Sources and Search Strategy
For data collection and extraction, Kitchenham method [50] is generally (not all the steps) used as
a guideline to extract data from each paper. At the beginning, we create the initial search query
by using Google Scholar, using some keywords that include the word notation or non-functional
requirements (security and privacy in specific). This resulted in general queries with combination
of AND and OR in between as seen in Table 5. These queries resulted in having many papers
where some of them is not very related to visual notation or non-functional requirements. However,
this step is used to give us an idea about which digital libraries and journals that interested in
notation, visualization and non-functional requirements. After that, we tried hybrid search using
more complex quires in specific journals and libraries which listed in Table 6 such as IEEE Xplore ,
Scopus, Springer, ACM, ScienceDirect etc.
For the notations study, papers from 1999 onward have been checked to ensure comparability
and to cover wide varieties of notations in general and secure one in specific. The search process is
done in many stages and several iterations that include three search processes: automatic, manual,
and snowballing.
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Table 5. Some queries and terms for online libraries search.
Category Queries and Terms
General “Architecture design”
“Visual” AND (“ languages” OR “notation”)
“Software design languages” OR “Software design Visual notation”
“Security” AND (combinations of the above)
“Privacy” AND (combinations of the above)
More spastic IEEE: ((((Software design Visual notation) AND “IoT”) AND “privacy”) OR “security”)
ACM: (+Visual +notation software requirements +security +privacy)
Scopus: TITLE-ABS-KEY-AUTH(“non functional” AND requirements AND IoT)
AND ( LIMIT-TO ( SUBJAREA,“COMP” ) OR LIMIT-TO ( SUBJAREA,“ENGI” ) )
AND ( LIMIT-TO ( LANGUAGE,“English” ) )
• Automatic search (Figure 6 and 7): This stage was performed using search engine using
keywords that combined any of the terms ‘Visual languages’, ‘Visual notation’, ‘Software
design languages’, ‘Software design Visual notation’, ‘Software notations’, Architecture design,
‘Privacy’, ‘use all above combinations’, ‘Security’, ‘IoT’, ‘Architecture’, ‘cyber physical systems’
and ‘ubiquitous Computing’. Google Scholar is used as a start point for searching since it
is considered as a good substitute to avoid bias in favour of any specific publisher [92].
Using this way, we took the advantage looking for the whole spectrum for all the available
publications regardless of the publishers.
• Manual search (Figure 6 and 7): This stage was done using the proceedings of some confer-
ences and journals as sources such as Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp), Journal of Systems
and Software (JSS), Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM) and
others listed in Table 6. For these sources, the studied time period is 2000-2019.
• Snowballing (Figure 6 and 7): This stage was performed on the set of papers that gathered
previously in manual search and based on known papers from the same relevant authors and
time period. Then, backward snowballing is performed by checking the references to select
relevant papers based on relevant title, abstract, and general structure review.
6.2 Data Extraction
As stated previously, Kitchenham method is generally followed for data clollecting. For each paper
many characteristics were extracted. All the collected and extracted data was structured in an
Excel spread sheet. For this study, a repository has been built which contains the meta-data for
the analyzed papers. Based on the built repository, we accomplished our analysis of the analyzed
papers. The meta-data contains: notation ID, name, publication year, scope, visual design based,
tool support, security/privacy support, IoT support, validation type, experiments’ participants
background, and the conference proceeding/journal. Finally, a list of 47 notations in different
publications remained, and all of them were analyzed in this survey.
Analysis of the apers. The publications distribution per year from 1999 to 2019 is presented in Figure
8 (A). The distribution of all analyzed papers’ publication types can be found in Figure 8 (B). It can
be noticeable that the peak publications on secure notation was in 2009-2010 with 12 papers in
total. In addition, most of the found papers come from journals and conference proceedings.
7 DESIGN NOTATION, LANGUAGES, AND REPRESENTATIONS
Many design notations have been created for security that intended to document security concepts
and features into a software design model. These efforts about notations are distributed and not
organized. This distribution makes it complex for researchers to assist existing notations to decide
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Table 6. Sources of Selected conference proceedings and journals for Manual and Automatic search that the
notations are selected from.
Venue Abbr. Source Publisher
OOPSLA ACM SIGPLAN conference companion on Object Oriented Programming Systems Lan-
guages and Applications
ACM
ESORICS European Symposium on Research in Computer Security Springer
DAC IEEE Design Automation Conference ACM\IEEE
EuroS PW IEEE European Symposium on Security and PrTransactions on Software Engineeringi-
vacy Workshops
IEEE
COMPSAC IEEE International Computer Software and Applications Conference IEEE
ICECCS IEEE International Conference on Engineering Complex Computer Systems Navigating
Complexity in the e-Engineering Age
IEEE
ICECCS IEEE International Conference on Engineering of Complex Computer Systems IEEE
SCC IEEE International Conference on Services Computing IEEE
ICSA-C IEEE International Conference on Software Architecture Companion IEEE
ICWS IEEE International Conference on Web Services IEEE
ISESS IEEE International Software Engineering Standards Symposium and Forum IEEE
VL/HCC IEEE Symposium on Visual Languages-Human Centric Computing IEEE
AVI International Conference on Advanced Visual Interfaces ACM
ICSE International Conference on Software Engineering ACM\IEEE
SEKE International Conference on Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering Springer
Conference
FME International FME Workshop on Formal Methods in Software Engineering ACM\IEEE
IST Information and Software Technology Elsevier
- Computers & Security Elsevier
- Computer Networks Elsevier
- Decision Support Systems Elsevier
TSE IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering IEEE
IEEE T SYST
MAN CY C
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C (Applications and Reviews) IEEE
IST Information and Software Technology Elsevier
IJSE International Journal of Software Engineering CSC
INTR Internet Research Emerald
JSW Journal of Software -
- Journal of Visual Languages and Computing Elsevier
- Science of Computer Programming Elsevier
SoSyM Software and Systems Modeling Springer
journal
- The Journal of Systems and Software Elsevier
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Fig. 8. Overview of the number of analysed papers. (a) distributed per year (1999-2019), and (b) by venue.
which technique they need to follow. There is an effort has been done in the field of reviewing
security notations such as [90]; however, it does not have anything about IoT and it needs to be
updated.
The following section presents a systematic literature review that investigates the available non-
functional requirements (security and privacy) notations and produces a comprehensive analysis for
each one of them. This will be done to understand which the techniques are they used to represent
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Fig. 9. Timeline for the analyzied notations, models, languages from 1999 to 2019.
security characteristics visually. After that, we will observe which privacy technique we can match
to develop later a model for a privacy notation.
In the beginning, we analyze 47 notations, languages, and representations for the period (1999-
2019) to have an overview of design representations over the last 20 years as seen in Figure 9. These
notations could follow some of the known representation standards such as UML and DFD, which
most of them do, as seen in Figure 10. In addition to the representation model, all the notations are
investigated in term of scope, coverage and tool support. Then we assessed the way these notations
have been evaluated and who are the participates in case the notations are experimentally validated.
7.1 Scope and Coverage
This study analyses 47 design notations for different coverage and purposes (see Table 7). This
study is trying to look at a variety of notations’ domains to assess how they are built, how they
support NFRs and how IoT can be built. Since the study are related to IoT, three of these notations
are covering IoT systems which are SiMoNa, Midgar and Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool. Since
building IoT systems is expanding rapidly for the last decade, it is expected to see the three systems
are recently produced in the last five years; 2014 for Midgar, 2018 for SiMoNa and 2019 for Microsoft
Threat Modeling Tool. Regarding the Non-functional requirements (NFRS), security and privacy
are the two assessed NFRs in this study. Security has been supported for more than the half of the
analysed papers (32 notations out of 47), while privacy is only covered in SPARTA, LINDDUN and
Sion-LINDDUN ( 3 notations out of 47).
It is noticeable that more than half of the analysed notations (25 out of 47 ) are generic and
are not focused on a specific application domain. There are some domain-specific notations, and
service-oriented architecture (SOA) is relatively common (7 notations). The other notations are
vary between database (3 notations), DSML (6 notations), web system(2 notations), design pattern
recovery (2 notations), authorization (1 notation), education (1 notation) and system-on-Ship (1
notation).
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Fig. 10. The analyzied notations, models, languages over the time ( in grey rectangles) with their associated
standard notations such as UML, DFD and BPMN (orange rectangles).
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Table 7. Analyses of 47 design notations based on the covered scope of notation.
List of notations
Scope Coverage
Name Citation Year Ge
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ADM-RBAC [20] 2008 " "
Ahn-AC [4] 2002 " "
Alam-SECTET [4] 2007 " "
AMF [44] 2010 " "
Buyens-LP [12] 2011 " "
FDAF [16] 2007 " "
Georg-AO [28] 2010 " "
Giordano AC [30] 2010 " "
Gomaa UML [31] 2004 " "
Hafner-SOA [35] 2005 " "
Hoisl-SOA [41] 2012 " "
Kim-AC [49] 2011 " "
Kong-Threat [52] 2009 " "
Mariscal-AC [69] 2010 " "
Medina-DB [86] 2009 " "
Memon-SECTET [57] 2012 " "
Nakamura-SOA [75] 2006 " "
PbSD [2] 2012 " "
Ray-AC [73] 2004 " "
SecureSOA [58] 2010 " "
SecureUML [10] 2009 " "
Sohr-AC [79] 2005 " "
UML AC [51] 2006 " "
UMLS [37] 2003 " "
UMLsec [48] 2008 " "
Vela-DB-XML [91] 2012 " "
Xu-Petri [95] 2006 " "
Yu-AC [96] 2009 " "
Hafner-SECTET [36] 2006 " "
SPARTA [77] 2018 " " "
VandenBerghe-DFD [88] 2017 "
LINDDUN [94] 2015 " "
Sion-LINDDUN [78] 2018 " "
Kaitiaki [53] 2005 "
Suzuki-UML [82] 1999 "
VLDesk [26] 2002 "
VESIG [17] 2010 "
Superlog [25] 2000 "
VisPro [97] 2001 " "
FESA-UML [23] 2009 "
Pounamu [64] 2004 " "
Milo [72] 2018 "
SiMoNa [18] 2018 " "
Midgar [33] 2014 " "
MetaEdit+ 5.5 [84] 2017 "
Microsoft Threat Modeling [60] 2019 " " "
Secure*BPMN [15] 2014 "
Total 25 3 2 7 1 2 1 6 1 3 32 3
7.2 Tool support
It can be seen from the Table 8 and Figure 11 that the majority of the analyzed notations that
they did not produce final tool (34 notations:16 notations with kind of prototype and 18 without
any tool support). Only around a quarter of the notations have a tool (12 out of 47 notations)
and some of the notations that have a tool do not support security such as SiMoNa which is IoT
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Table 8. Representation model and tool support for investigated notations.
Final product Supported Model
Notation Citation To
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e
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ne
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No
n
UM
L/
DF
D
ADM-RBAC [20] "  
Ahn-AC [4] "  
Alam-SECTET [4] "  
AMF [44] "  
Buyens-LP [12] "  
FDAF [16] "  
Georg-AO [28] "  
Giordano AC [30] "  
Gomaa UML [31] "  
Hafner-SOA [35] "  
Hoisl-SOA [41] "  
Kim-AC [49] "  
Kong-Threat [52] "  
Mariscal-AC [69] "  
Medina-DB [86] "  
Memon-SECTET [57] "  
Nakamura-SOA [75] "  
PbSD [2] "  
Ray-AC [73] "  
SecureSOA [58] "  
SecureUML [10] "  
Sohr-AC [79] "  
UML AC [51] "  
UMLS [37] "  
UMLsec [48] "  
Vela-DB-XML [91] "  
Xu-Petri [95] "  
Yu-AC [96] "  
Hafner-SECTET [36] "  
SPARTA [77] "  
VandenBerghe-DFD [88] "  
LINDDUN [94] "  
Sion-LINDDUN [78] "  
Kaitiaki [53] "  
Suzuki-UML [82] "  
VLDesk [26] "  
VESIG [17] "  
Superlog [25] "  
VisPro [97] "  
FESA-UML [23] "  
Pounamu [64] "  
Milo [72] "  
SiMoNa [18] "  
Midgar [33] "  
MetaEdit+ 5.5 [84] "  
Microsoft Threat Modeling [60] "  
Secure*BPMN [15]
Total 12 16 18 27 5 14
infographics domain-specific modelling language. As stated in [90], lacking tool support is due to
the low maturity of the secure software design field and there is a gap in this area.
7.3 Representation support
UML-based notations . The majority of used notations to represent security concerns are
founded to be a Unified Modeling Language (UML) based, as stated in [90]. Since the main focus, in
this paper, is non-functional requirements (NFRs), most of the notations that have been collected
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are concern about security. Consequently, as seen in Table 8 most of them found to be UML based
(27 notations out of 47). Some of the design notations are created to only detect new vulnerabilities
while others such as Georg-AO [28] does not. In Georg-AO proposed notation [28], they assess if
this attack cause a huge risk then some security mechanism will be applied to mitigate it.
DFD-based notations . As mentioned previously, most of the common security design notations
are UML-based. Data Flow Diagram (DFD) is another notation based that followed by some, such
as VandenBerghe-DFD and SPARTA modeling notations [88][77]. In VandenBerghe-DFD, they
proposed a model which is inspired by DFD with some security elements and attached with well-
defined semantics. In this model, the expert developer knowledge’s that used for identifying and
mitigating the potential threats will be supported to guarantee the correctness of applied security
solution. This model has been illustrated using a banking system to show how it can be used as
a strong foundation for security by design paradigm. In SPARTA, they represented a prototype
that simplifies the embedding of security and privacy. That’s done by supporting the process of
capturing security and privacy patterns in a DFD-based design then provide threat elicitation based
on constructed knowledge.
LINDDUN and Sion-LINDDUN both are another example that use DFD in their activities repre-
sentation [93] [94] [78]. LINDDUN is threat modelling methodology that is focusing mainly on
privacy where a systemic approach for producing the privacy requirements is proposed. Identifying
all potential privacy threats is done by iterating over the model elements. After that, the threats are
manually assessed based on their importance (likelihood and impact). Likewise, Microsoft Threat
Modeling, which follows a STRIDE, is threat modelling methodology for security.
NonUML orDFDbased notations . UML andDFD, as explained previously, are general-purpose
modelling languages for many of the systems. On the other hand, some languages are Domain-
Specific Modeling Languages (DSML) or very specialized ones (14 in total in this study) as seen in
Table 8. In DSML, a domain-specific language is used to represent a system such as SiMoNa [18].
SiMoNa is an IoT Infographic Domain-Specific Modeling Language. It is built using MetaEdit+ 5.5
workbench software which uses a GOPPRR(Graph, Object, Port, Property, Relationship and Role)
meta-modelling language.
Furthermore, there are very specialized visual language such as ADM-RBAC and Giordano-AC
[20] [30]. ADM-RBAC (Ariadne Development Method with Role-Based Access Control) is used
for modelling hypermedia and web systems area to specify RBAC access rules at integrated two
abstraction levels. This notation is an extension of the Ariadne Development Method (ADM) which
does not use UML for its representation. Instead, the visual model is designed for role-based
access control (RBAC); where a role can be created with defined relations, assigned permissions
and generated policies. In conceptual models, policies are specified using function specifications,
authorization rules and the user diagrams. In detailed models, policies are specified using access
tables in addition to some of the previously produced models from conceptual phase with more
details [20]. Likewise ADM-RBAC, Giordano-AC model [30] is a visual model for role-based access
control (RBAC) which does not use UML mainly for its representation. In Giordano AC system,
there are many tools for enabling a different kind of users to edit the security policies visually.
After that, the system will generate XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) code.
7.4 Validation of the Notations
As seen in Table 9, a summary of the performed validation type that has been done for each design
notation along with the number and educational background of participants if there is any. It is
noticeable that the majority of the notations lack case studies and experiments; in contrast, most of
them have been illustrated in one or multiple examples. However, most of the illustration examples
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Fig. 11. chart (A) shows most of the notations did not produce any tool (13 out of 47). chart (B) shows that
most of the analyzed papers are UML-based modelling.
are abstract and lack of deep details. Only a few of the notations used experiments (10 out of 47)
and some have case studies (10 out of 47) as a way of validation. In the experiments, it is noticeable
that most of the experiments‘ participants have master degree as seen in Figure 12. Besides that,
some do not have any kind of illustration validation such as Sohr-AC and Ahn-AC.
While some notations such as Giordano AC uses a group of heterogeneous people such as from
universities, industrial managers and technicians, others like ADM-RBAC and PbSD, uses a group
master and bachelor students respectively. In ADM-RBAC [20], a comparison has been done on
the experiment; where 18 evaluators are divided into two groups. One of the groups trained while
the other is not. All the evaluators are first-year master students, and the evaluation is part of a
Hypermedia Design course. These experiments are done on a small scope and lack of deep analysis.
In Giordano AC [30], the authors validate their model using both the use case and experiment. The
case study done by using 20 evaluators who are managers and technicians are from universities and
industries, participated to test system usability using a technique called think. In the experiment,
they compared their notation to the most related visual-based tool called XGrid. The evaluators
participated for three days and follow the think-aloud technique using a one-to-one session. Each
validator has an introductory course for 90 minutes about the two systems and their notations.
After that, they were asked to use these systems for 20 minutes with tutor support. Then, they were
asked to apply three different scenarios with using the systems tools in the definition of access
policies. The scenarios include file hosting service, Massively multiplayer online role-playing game
(MMORPG), and content management system. This experiment is done on a small scale (only 6
participants) and lacks an in-depth analysis. In the use case, they produce a Multimedia Content
Management System (MCMS) as a collaboration with a software development company and embed
access control policies using their approach. MCMS is based on open source content management
system called OpenCMS, that provide extending some modules simply. By applying their approach,
the authorizing and administrating users are simplified.
In PbSD [2], 148 third-year undergraduate students participated in the experiment from (Security
of Computers and Communication Networks) course. The students are from different departments:
Information Systems Engineering (ISE) and Software Engineering (SE) programs and were divided
into two groups to apply some tasks to see the security requirements comparison between PbSD
with SQL and OracleâĂŹs VPD.
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Table 9. Validation techniques that used for each notation which can be Case studies, Experiments and
illustrations. Novice, undergraduate, master, PhD and expert are the experimentsâĂŹ participants educational
background. (*)For Experiments column: the number represents the total number of participants in the
experiment for each notation. Empty cell indicates there is no experiment done. (-) in SPARTA means that
they stated there is an experiment, but they did not give details about the participants number or background.
Participants Validation
background technique
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ADM-RBAC [20] " 18 "
Ahn-AC [4]
Alam-SECTET [4] "
AMF [44] "
Buyens-LP [12] " "
FDAF [16] "
Georg-AO [28] "
Giordano AC [30] " " " " 20
Gomaa UML [31] "
Hafner-SOA [35] "
Hoisl-SOA [41] "
Kim-AC [49] " "
Kong-Threat [52] "
Mariscal-AC [69] "
Medina-DB [86] " "
Memon-SECTET [57] "
Nakamura-SOA [75] "
PbSD [2] " 148 "
Ray-AC [73] "
SecureSOA [58] "
SecureUML [10] "
Sohr-AC [79]
UML AC [51] "
UMLS [37] "
UMLsec [48] " "
Vela-DB-XML [91] " "
Xu-Petri [95] " "
Yu-AC [96] "
Hafner-SECTET [36] "
SPARTA [77] -
VandenBerghe-DFD [88] "
LINDDUN [94] "
Sion-LINDDUN [78] "
Kaitiaki [53] "
Suzuki-UML [82] "
VLDesk [26] " "
VESIG [17] " 12 "
Superlog [25] "
VisPro [97] " "
FESA-UML [23] "
Pounamu [64] "
Milo [72] " 20 "
SiMoNa [18] "
Midgar [33] " " 21 "
MetaEdit+ 5.5 [84] "
Microsoft Threat Modeling [60] "
Secure*BPMN [15] " " " 31 "
Total 1 1 5 1 3 10 270 43
Likewise PbSD, VESIG initial tool was tested in (Formal Methods for Web Design) course using
12 master students on Science and Technology in Computing [17]. The required design task is
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Fig. 12. Pie chart (left) shows validation type. Pie chart (Right) shows experiment participants educational
background.
done by pairs for 90 minutes divided as: 10 minutes was an introduction to the tool from VESIG
team, 45 minutes to draw a sketch on a paper, and the remaining time is used to apply the sketch
using the tool and completing 6 open questions. In the end, 6 different design and 12 questioners
are collected. Not only postgraduate students are the one used for evaluation, but Milo web-based
visual programming experiment is also done on 20 computer science undergraduate students [72].
In Midgar [33], the experiment is done based on 21 participants who tested individually. 12 of
the participants are software developers and 9 of them are people who interested in IoT. They have
been asked to evaluate the applications’ editor and generator from the developer and the user point
of view. In SPARTA [77], they stated that the evaluation is done by running a risk analysis on
the WebRTC, submitting SPARTA system to SecureDrop system, and comparing it with Microsoft
Threat Analysis performance.
Some of the notation their case studies are similar to an example scenario. For example, Kim-
AC case study is presented as an application for online shopping while Xu-Petri case study is
about modelling real-world shopping cart application [95] [95]. Both of them is applying STRIDE
technique to identify threats. There are no participants for real and extensive analysis. Medina-DB
on the other hand, has a deep case study about the Secure Data Warehouse for several pharmacies
done by the authors themselves in separate paper [80]. Likewise, VisPro and UMLsec have some
examples and case studies some of them have some details [48][97].
8 DESIGN PRINCIPLES (TOOLING) FOR NON FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
So far reviewed number or different design notation and languages that are being developed to
design application. The next most important step is to make these notations available for the
software engineers to use within SDLC. For example, Visual Paradigm (visual-paradigm.com) is
a Tool that has been developed to make design notations and languages (such as UML 2, SysML
and Business Process Modeling) available for software engineers to use. These tools are designed
to augment the software design capabilities of software engineers and to make the software
development process efficient and effective (e.g., help to designs faster, help to reduce human
errors/mistakes). In this section, we are going to review different design principles and how they
are being applied in existing design tools (related to security / privacy / IoT).
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Designing is considered as an easy thing to do when everything goes smoothly and right until a
mistake or misunderstanding happened then complications occur rapidly. One of the solutions is
adapting a human-centred design (HCD) approach [47]. In this approach human needs, behaviours
and capabilities are taken into consideration in the first place. Therefore, understanding psychology
should go with understanding the technology side by side. Additionally, this approach adapts
building good communication to achieve good design especially if there is a machine required in
the design. This is done for understanding the interaction between machines and humans. It is
more important for designers to understand what will happen if things go wrong more than what
will happen if it goes as planned.
8.1 Fundamental Principles of Interaction
There are many principles of good interaction design and one of them is Norman [65]. He divides
the principles to five which are: affordances, signifiers, mapping, feedback, and conceptual model.
Three tools will be evaluated based on these principles later to see who it can be applied. It can be
seen in Table 10 which are: ViSiT, Microsoft threat modelling and ThreatDragon.
Affordance term means the relationship between the individual and object, in the way of how
the person can understand the features of the object and how it can be used [65]. The physical
object should express how people can interact with them and this should be visible in the design.
For designers, affordance distinguishability is very critical because visible affordances deliver clear
signs to the operations of objects. Users should not pay a lot of effort to understand the proper way
of how to use the features of things.
Signifiers are the guidance to the user of how to follow what the object can afford and do it in
the right way. Designers have the responsibilities to design something understandable and quickly
picked by the users. If there is a touch screen where the users need to touch something in order to
go to other windows, there should be signifiers to tell them where exactly to touch. For example,
there is a clinic profile as seen in Figure 13. This page has many icons and arrows which offer
signals about the produced actions for the clinic. Swiping up left and right arrows move to new
clinic suggestions. Swiping down is a sign to see people recommendations and reviews. Clicking
the map pin icon will direct to the clinic location on the map. Affordance and signifiers are easy
and common to mix in between [65], so in this case, touching is what the object affords, the arrow
is the sign where the user should apply the touch. If we apply this principle to ViSiT [68], the
tool UI has many signifiers such as: Having grid-lines in the canvas that guide the user to place
the target collections and properties, having many buttons such as the one to save and run the
transformation, having icons to zoom canvas or ask for help.
Mapping in simple words is the relationship between two things. In design, it is easy to use object
if there is a mapping between the layout and device. For example, if there is an arrow pointing up
at the touch screen, it supposed when it is pressed to move the object up not down, left or right.
A good design put in mind, during planning, how people behave to develop mapping. IoT design
application tool should consider this principle while implementing the UI. For Example, in Table 10
ViSiT [68] has the icon of a floppy disk which is known as mapping for saving the task.
Feedback: is away of allowing the users to know that the request is under process. It is a kind
of communication with the users, so they do not feel ignored or lost. Good design must balance
between ignoring the feedbacks or overusing them which both are annoying and lead to stop using
the object (such as system software). So, while designing a designing tool this should be kept in
mind to balance between asking and annoying users about every single privacy concerns, and
keeping them notified about the critical one and keep some of them as default settings.
A conceptual model as it is defined in some sources as âĂĲa high-level description of how a
system is organized and operates” [46]. In general, it is a simplified and easy way to explain to
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Table 10. Comparison between three tools: ViSiT, Microsoft threat modeling and Threat Dragon in term of
principles of good interaction design.(*) ViSiT is analyzed based on the Figures on paper. (**) Not mentioned
on the paper.
ViSiT* Microsoft threat modeling ThreatDragon
AFFORDANCES It has visible affordance where
user can understand the idea of
dragging and dropping expres-
sions then running the transfor-
mations.
It has visible affordance where
user can understand the idea of
drawing DFD as any other DFD
drawing tool. Then it can do
the threat analysis. It also sup-
ports creating custom threat
templates.
It has visible affordance where
user can understand the idea
of drawing DFD. However, it
does not support drag and drop
which is used to be in most of
designing tools.
SIGNIFIERS It supports many signifiers
such as:
• icons (zoom in/out,
help, delete expression)
• buttons (save, run ..etc)
• gridline
It supports many signifiers
such as:
• icons (zoom in/out,
help)
• buttons (save, run ..etc)
• drop-down menus
• grid-line
However, linking two objects is
not clear due to lacking for sig-
nifiers to say how to do that. It
takes many tries to understand
that one of the ways is selecting
the two object then right-click
to choose the linking option.
It supports many signifiers
such as:
• icons (zoom in/out)
• drop-down menus
However, the design is simple
and lack of extra buttons and
more signifiers.
The green arrow above the ob-
ject:
MAPPING When an object is taken from
the target and properties collec-
tion, the object automatically
placed in the shown grid at the
left-hand side. It supports drag
and drop from the toolbox.
Mapping is supported. Low mapping support. When
the object from the toolbox is
double-clicked, it appears in
the canvas. Having toolbox lo-
cated at the left contains many
objects, sometimes indicates
dragging the objects to the can-
vas; however, it does not sup-
port drag and drop which is
used to be in most of designing
tools.
FEEDBACK N/A** Feedback is supported. For ex-
ample, when a developer is
changing the name of any ob-
ject from the stencils, it appears
immediately at the object in the
main canvas.
There is feedback for example
when the arrow is pressed mes-
sage appears to tell the user
what to do. However, the re-
sponse time is slow, and the
user can doubt about the re-
quest will be done or not.
The message:
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Fig. 13. Icons and arrows signifiers are
used here on a touch screen. They offer
signals about the produced actions for
the clinic. Swiping left and right arrows
move to new clinic suggestions. Swiping
down, to see people recommendations
and reviews. Clicking the map pin icon
will direct to the clinic location on the
map; clicking on the clock will show the
opening hours.
Clinic name
people about how something going to work. For example, using folders and icons in a computer
OS is a way of helping users to create the conceptual model; while in the reality this is not the way
files are organized and saved inside the computer. There are many different conceptual models
such as the one shown in the product technical support; however, the one that most concerned in
designing is the mental model [47]. The mental model reflects how people understand how things
work. The same item could have different mental models created by different people. In fact, a
person may have a variety of mental models for the same item depending on his interpretation
for each part’s function. The good conceptual model should be clear and understandable by the
support of using affordances, signifiers and constraints.
By adopting a good conceptual model in IoT application designing tool, it will be easier for the
developer to predict the effects and what plan to follow if things go wrong and not as planned
while designing a data flow for an IoT application. If the model is complex that means the user
should read the manual, again and again, to understand how things work.
Parush [68] adds some details and divides the conceptual model for interactive systems it into
five layers framework. These layers starting from bottom up are: function, configuration, navigation
and policy, form and details layer. For illustration, all these layers will be mapped to Visual Simple
Transformations tool called ViSiT [5] as seen in Figure 14. This tool is enabling the end-user to
connect the Internet of Things (IoT) entities (services and things). It visualizes IoT solutions by using
the metaphor of the jigsaw puzzle for specifying the transformation. This hierarchical conceptual
model could be adapted while developing an interactive IoT designing tool.
In the bottom is the function layer where a group of objects and tasks and their properties
are stated to fulfil the required work such as how thing and service in ViSiT tool interact with
each other. Configuration layer represents the abstraction of the functions and its relationship
between its elements. It can be defined as functional architecture where the configuration of the
conceptual model elements is based on the elements’ relationship. In websites design, functional
and information architecture are equivalent but in conceptual design is not. Information here
is one of the elements as well as the object and its parameters. The navigation and policy layer
describes the interactive system where navigating takes the user from place to another place based
on predefined navigation map for routing instructions’. For example, if the user wants to drag a
puzzle piece into the canvas (physical place) will it be in the same window (place) or dragged into
other windows (places). Form layer is the layer that transforms from a high abstraction level to
more detailed one that can be designed later into a user interface (UI). In this layer, many decisions
are made which could affect the performance and usability of the system later on. The details of
function chunks are mapped into physical places and connected with some actions such as where
to fill in the properties and values of one event of ViSiT in order then to link it with a method.
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Details
Function
Configuration
Navigation
and	Policy
Form
Functional
Chunks
ConceptualModel Elements
PhysicalModel Elements
DetailedConceptual Elements
UserInterfaceElements
Item	1
Item	2
Item	3
Item	4
Setting 1
Setting 2
Setting 3
Setting 4
Button Button
Fig. 14. Parush layered framework [68] that represents conceptual model for interactive systems is applied
on ViSiT IoT tool [5] to explaine how it can adapted while developing an interactive IoT designing tool.
Finally, the user interface is the top layer of the conceptual model where all the details of graphical
representation and visual layout are specified such as locations, colours, fonts and icons of the
items.
As said ViSiT IoT tool supports somehow detailed model while other tools do not. Threat Dragon,
which is threat modelling tool, is more basic without any clear support to IoT. The threat is
represented simply without further details in the right side of the tool windows in the form of
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Table 11. Threat Dragon compared to Microsoft threat modeling.
Web-based Desktop-based Open source Representation IoT support
Threat Dragon " " " DFD ✗
Microsoft threat modeling ✗ " ✗ DFD "
chick boxes. On the other hand, the Microsoft threat modelling tool supports IoT security threats
in the last version (2018). In Microsoft, after pressing analyze button the threats are presented
in the bottom side of the same windows. All the threat is classified based on the term of threat
title, category, description and priority...etc. Some of them even linked to the Microsoft website for
further explanation about the threat and how it can be overcome. A short comparison between
both of them (Microsoft threat modelling and Threat dragon) is illustrated in Table 11.
As will as ViSiT IoT tool, some analyzed notations such as ADM-RBAC [20] supports detailed
models for access specification to provide further details from the previous phase. In contrast,
both Microsoft Threat Modeling tool and Threat Dragon tools have a single level of view where
everything is shown in the same window and they do not support any kind of multiple detailed
views or moving into other windows. Both approaches, basic or detailed user interface can be
mixed to have an IoT designing tool that affirms to what user needs.
9 RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
As explained previously IoT application design has some challenges and adding some changes or
enhancements to the traditional SDLC are required. Below are some of the presented solutions
or enhancements to make IoT development more controllable such as integrating some threat
modelling techniques during the design stage such as STRIDE, introducing a framework to support
privacy, or enhancing the SDLC to include different views such as prosumerization.
9.1 Lack on Notations and Languages for Privacy
One of the solutions to make a system secure while designing is using threat modelling techniques
such as OWASP [67] and Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool [60] during the design phase. There are
two main methodologies, STRIDE and DREAD, that have been used for most of threat modelling
techniques [24]. STRIDE, which Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool uses, is acronym made up for
mapping the threat categories which are: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure,
Denial of Service and Elevation of Privilege. DREAD acronym for risk calculation metrics which
are: Damage Potential, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users and Discoverability. The
difference between the two is that STRIDE is used for threat identification while DREAD is used for
risk calculation. Both OWASP [67] and Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool [60] are used for security
threats and none of them used for privacy in particular.
9.2 Lack of Tools to Supplement Methods
As stated in Section 9.1, there are some tools that are used for security threats with absence for
a framework for privacy. Since the main focus of STRIDE is security threat modelling, there-
fore LINDDUN was introduced to cover the privacy requirements. LINDDUN is a model-based
technique/ framework that has been done to focus exclusively on modelling privacy threats in
software-based systems [94]. It is an acronym for seven types of threats: Linkability, Identifiabil-
ity, Non-repudiation, Detectability, information Disclosure, content Unawareness and policy, and
consent Non-compliance. All of these threats are mapped to the application DFD parts after it is
created as seen in Table 12.
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Table 12. Security and privacy concerns with its corresponding threats mapped with DFD elements that
vulnerable to threats. (DF: Data flow, DS: Data store, P: Process, E: External entity). STRIDE and LINDDUN
are proposed by the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) [43] and Privacy Threats in Software Architectures
[94] respectively.
Property Threat DF DS P E
Authentication Spoofing • •
Integrity Tampering • • •
Non-repudiation Repudiation • • •
Confidentiality Information Disclosure • • •
Availability Denial of Service • • •S
ec
ur
ity
ST
RI
D
E
Authorization Elevation of Privilege •
Unlinkability Linkability • • • •
Anonymity and pseudonymity Identifiability • • • •
Plausible deniability Non-repudiation • • •
Undetectability and unobservability Detectability • • •
Confidentiality Disclosure of information • • •
Content awareness Content Unawareness •
Pr
iv
ac
y
LI
N
D
D
UN
Policy and consent compliance Policy and Consent Non-compliance • • •
Fig. 15. LINDDUN vs STRIDE Methodology
STRIDE and LINDUDUNN have a different methodology in the way of the order of the steps that
deal with the threats as seen in Figure 15. In STRIDE, it is started with defining use case scenarios
while it is the thirds step in LINDDUN which start with defining the DFD. As well as STRIDE,
which adapted in Microsoft threat modelling tool to cover security concerns, we believe LINDDUN
could be used to fulfil the privacy gap on other IoT tools. As stated, LINNDU was initiated as a
framework but it does not have privacy pattern or tool yet.
9.3 Proactive Assistance
Proactive servicemeans anticipating/predicting usersâĂŹ concerns and addressing them proactively.
For instance, most of the users when they have any concerns while browsing a website or using a
tool, they will go to help or contact us option. Then, it becomes a waiting issue to resolve these
concerns or questions. While in proactive service, the user concerns are predicted and solutions
are offered based on the behaviour and the action have been made.
By identifying and addressing any issue before it becomes a problem, availability of equipment
and applications increases. Some places, such as hospitals, require high availability of critical
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hardware. For instance, Philips [71] has a solution called e-Alert which is used to ensure high
performance of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) systems. It is done by sensing and monitoring
the system continuously and responding quickly to any possible issues with MRI by issuing
mobile messaging alerts that sent to biomeds and Philips service engineers. Currently, many of the
worldwide top-technical companies are tending to move from reactive to proactive engagement
process. By supporting such a method, it will be possible to prevent any concerns before they arise.
For example, Oracle [66] has proactive diagnostic support tools that predict system behaviour,
prioritize actions, and prevent potential problems.
In IoT, the balance between the business’s requirements and people’s privacy is a big issue. Since
IoT technology does not have completely standardize security and privacy requirements [14], there
is a need for a proactive framework and assistant tool to help while developing IoT applications.
There are tools with minimum proactive support or without proactive support especially the one
that used during the designing phase of IoT applications. For example, if a developer wants to
draw a data flow for a supermarket security system. There will be a smart camera in front of a
supermarket which will be collecting Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such as human faces.
The engineer does not know how long you keep the data, where it should be stored, and what is
the compatible way to deal these data to agree with the Law. There is a need for a tool that waves
the burden from the developer; whenever a camera is dragged and dropped, privacy concerns will
pop up automatically somewhere to give a hint about IoT privacy concerns. We are focusing on the
architecture/design part, where a data is flowing the privacy is preserved.
9.4 Integration of IoT Standards and Privacy
One of the studies that have been done is integrating OWASP standard Secure-SDLC with Microsoft
Threat Modeling Tool in the IoT Application SDLC to produce a Secure-SDLC for IoT [24]. In
Fernandes [24] study, privacy and security are demonstrated in healthcare application (IoT based
Health Monitor). This application is used for tracking and monitoring the body temperature
and pulse rate of hospitalsâĂŹ patients. Here, security has been integrated while designing and
implementing the system. The main idea is embedding security requirements from first to the final
software\system development stages, from requirements gathering to deployment.
At each stage, a number of known vulnerabilities are identified and mitigated. After that, testing
for IoT based Health Monitor is made by using Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
top 5 IoT vulnerabilities. The SDLC is divided into five phases: Requirements Gathering, Design,
Development, Testing and Deployment [24]. Each phase has its level of own security review. In
Requirement Gathering phase (planning and analysis), any security requirements and significant
risks are identified and added at this stage. Security requirements can be associated with one
of these: authentication, authorization, error handling, session management, input validations,
logging, secure communications, storage... etc.
In the Design phase of the IoT solution, security threat modelling techniques are used for revising
the design. At the development\implementation phase, code revision is done to identify all coding
errors that can cause any security risks. In the testing phase, the system is tested to confirm and
validate that it meets the FRs as well as the NFRs. For example, testing the system using tests cases
with OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities. This step can make sure the system has a level of security.
In the final stage, deployment, secure configurations are added to the system configurations with
retesting for further variabilities [24].
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Fig. 16. Methodological approach in Developers’ and Prosumers’ views based on [55].
9.5 Tools and Methods for Stakeholder Engagement through Codesign
Another way to develop IoT system is to follow End-user development (EUD) approaches for design
and development such as the one represented in Martin work [55]. End-user development (EUD)
suggests that end-users could develop their own programs by giving them suitable tools that fulfil
their requirements and save costs and efforts.
In this Martin [55], a framework was created for enabling the prosumer users to create services
in IoT scenarios since these scenarios are ideal for adopting the prosumer role. Prosumer is a
combination of producer and consumer where the individual consumes and produces a product.
The main goal for this framework is to enable the end-user (who does not have a high level of
expertise) to be involved in development stages. The framework structured based on two interacted
roles which are developers and prosumers. Each one of them has its own view as seen in Figure 16.
In the developers’ view, the defined methodology has the five traditional stages of software
development which are: requirement acquisition, analysis, design, implementation and testing.
Each of these developer stages in the service creation framework should take into account the
prosumer value. There are five more stages that present the prosumers’ view which are: training,
service needing identification system element identification, service building, and measuring. This
framework was tested for creating and personalizing templates of web technologies in hospital
pharmacy drug management. The built prototype was tested by allowing prosumer users, who
have no technical expertise, such as pharmacy workers. They did some actions such as creating
and sharing stock notifications for drugs available in the pharmacy. This testing was made to make
sure the presented approach has benefited from engaging the prosumer in the design phase to
increase the usability of the system.
10 CONCLUSION
There is evidence that number of IoT applications being developed are growing. This increasing
is facing many complications in the field of designing and developing these applications such as
supporting nodes heterogeneity, multiple hardware/software, multiple technologies, and developers’
divers working togetherâĂęetc. With all of these complexities, all of the components are vulnerable
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to attacks. In IoT, security/privacy as non-functional requirements (NFRs) are critical due to its
complicated nature; however, they tend to be ignored.
This survey has stated the results of a literature review in the field of designing non-functional
requirements in the internet of things. We examined, how such results can be applied to reduce IoT
application design process complexity. In this survey, 47 notations, language, representation have
been systematically scanned. Design principles, challenges and opportunities are also provided.
The study has shown that most of the analyzed publications support security somehow, and rarely
support privacy. It also highlights potential issues in supporting proactive design tools for IoT
privacy. Finally, we identified and discussed six research gaps related to privacy in IoT that need to
be addressed.
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